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Market vs. Residence Principle: Experimental
Evidence on the Eects of a Financial
Transaction Tax
Jurgen Hubery, Michael Kirchlerz, Daniel Kleinlercherx,
and Matthias Sutter{
Abstract
While politically attractive in order to generate tax revenues, the ef-
fects of a nancial transaction tax (FTT) are scientically disputed, not
the least because seemingly small details of its implementation may mat-
ter a lot. In this paper, we provide experimental evidence on the dierent
eects of a FTT, depending on whether it is implemented as a tax on
markets, on residents, or a combination of both. We nd that the eects
of a tax on markets are dierent from a tax on residents, with negative
eects of a market tax on volatility and trading volume. The residence
principle shows none of these undesired eects. In addition to studying
aggregate market outcomes, we investigate how individual traders react
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to dierent forms of a FTT and whether their risk attitude is related to
these reactions. We nd no such relationship, meaning that a FTT aects
traders with dierent risk tolerances similarly.
JEL classication: C91, G10, E62
Keywords: Financial Transaction Tax, experimental nance, residence principle,
market principle.
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1 Introduction
Few other issues stir emotions as easily as \taxes". This also holds for a Finan-
cial Transaction Tax (FTT) { dubbed \Robin Hood Tax" by its supporters, but
ercely contested by others as seemingly threatening to destroy the nancial
sector. Especially since eleven member countries of the European Union have
been considering to implement a FTT by 2015, the discussion about the eects
of a FTT has gained momentum.1 Such a tax is politically highly controversial,
because it has rarely been implemented in practice. Hence, evidence on its likely
eects is still very limited.
The academic debate has missed some important institutional details so
far, for which reason it cannot provide unambiguous evidence as a basis for the
political debate. In particular, the academic literature on a FTT has practically
ignored the exact taxation scenarios, i.e. whether such a tax is implemented on
all trades in a given market { which we call the \market principle" { or on all
trades by residents in a particular jurisdiction { which we call the \residence
principle".
In this paper, we explore the consequences of applying these dierent taxa-
tion principles. We do so in a controlled laboratory experiment, using the lab
as a \wind-tunnel" environment to test how the market principle, the residence
principle, or a combination of both, aect market outcomes, such as trading vol-
ume, tax revenues, volatility, and market eciency, as well as individual trading
behavior. In particular, experimental subjects can trade assets for money in two
independent jurisdictions, each with one nancial market. We implement either
a tax on residents, a market tax, a combination of a market tax and a tax on
residents within the same jurisdiction, or a tax on residents for one jurisdiction
and a market tax on the other.
We nd that applying the residence principle { meaning that all trades of
1The eleven countries are Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. The level of the FTT is likely to be 0.1% on stock
transactions and 0.01% on derivatives transactions. The EU commission, expecting that
stock transactions will fall by 15% and derivative transactions by 75%, still forecasts to raise
30 to 35 bn. euros in tax income per year.
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residents of one jurisdiction are taxed, irrespective of whether they trade on
their home market or on the foreign market (an approach similarly discussed in
the European Union) { has no signicant eects on trading volume or volatility.
Thus, it causes practically no distortions on the markets and tax revenues are
substantial. When the market principle is applied { i.e., all transactions in one
market are taxed, while the other market is not taxed { we observe a signicant
shift in trading volume: about three quarters of trading in the taxed market
shift to the untaxed alternative. With liquidity in the taxed market evaporating,
volatility increases signicantly, while it drops in the untaxed market where
liquidity increases.
The combination of both principles in one jurisdiction leads to a signi-
cant drop in trading volume in the jurisdiction implementing both market and
residence principle, and an increase in the other one. By contrast, volatility in-
creases in the jurisdiction applying the market and residence principle and drops
in the one without any tax burden. However, the overall market distortion is
weaker compared to the sole implementation of the market principle, but clearly
higher compared to jurisdictions implementing only the residence principle.
In the last taxation scenario where one jurisdiction applies the market prin-
ciple and the other one the residence principle, trade shifts from the jurisdiction
with a market tax to the one where only the residents are taxed, causing market
distortions within the jurisdiction that applies the market principle.
In addition to disentangling the eects of a market or residence principle,
another contribution of our paper is to show how individual traders with dif-
ferent attitudes towards risk are inuenced by the introduction of a FTT. We
nd that traders with high risk tolerance trade signicantly more than strongly
risk-averse traders. However, risk attitude is irrelevant for a subject's reaction
to FTTs: Risk seeking and risk averse traders are equally aected by the intro-
duction of a FTT. We consider these insights on an individual level as important
for a deeper understanding of how a FTT aects market outcomes. Remarkably,
this micro-foundation has been absent in previous experimental work on a FTT.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the most
closely related literature is briey discussed. In Section 3 the experimental
design is introduced. In Section 4 we present results on the aggregate market
level, while in Section 5 we look at individual level data. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 Related literature
In 1936, John Maynard Keynes rst advocated the introduction of a FTT on
stock markets as the best way to mitigate the predominance of destabilizing
short-term speculation over stabilizing long-term investment (Keynes, 1936).
After the fall of the Bretton-Woods system, a similar line of argument was
adopted by James Tobin, when he called for the introduction of a FTT on
foreign exchange markets to curb excessive speculation (Tobin, 1978).2 Notably,
neither Keynes nor Tobin supported their proposals with empirical or analytical
research.
This fact did not change until the late 1980ies when scientic research on
the impact of a FTT of the market principle-type gained momentum.3 Since
then there is broad scientic consensus on the negative eects of a FTT of the
market principle-type on trading volume. Other important issues, namely the
impact of a FTT on volatility and market eciency, are still controversially
debated, with strong academic supporters for both sides. In one of the earliest
empirical contributions Umlauf (1993) reports an increase of price volatility af-
ter Sweden introduced a round trip tax on equity transactions in 1984.4 Aliber
et al. (2003) empirically investigate the impact of the size of transaction costs
on volatility and show that higher transaction costs are associated with higher
volatility. More recently, contributions by Ehrenstein (2002), Westerho (2003),
2See ul Haq et al. (1996); Spahn (2002); Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003); McCulloch and
Pacillo (2011) for various surveys.
3See e.g. Stiglitz (1989); Summers and Summers (1989); Schwert and Seguin (1993).
4See Kupiec (1995), Jones and Seguin (1997), Baltagi et al. (2006), and Hau (2006) for
more empirical research in this tradition.
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and Ehrenstein et al. (2005) provide evidence that a FTT drives chartists from
the taxed market and hence stabilizes prices.5 Turning to the eects of a FTT
on market eciency, Cipriani and Guarino (2008) and Bloomeld et al. (2009)
study the eects of a FTT in an experimental nancial market. The former nd
an increase in informational eciency, but hardly any eects on market volatil-
ity. The latter investigate the eects of a FTT on market eciency through
informational cascades. They report no eects on market eciency in their
experiments. In contrast, theoretical work by Subrahmanyam (1998) and Dow
and Rahi (2000) concludes that a FTT would decreases market eciency. To
sum up, there is no agreement on the consequences of a FTT of the market
principle-type on price volatility and market eciency.
A limitation of many of the papers mentioned so far is that they consider
only one market. While such papers are useful to understand how a tax aects
aggregate market outcomes, they are obviously limited to cases where a FTT
would cover all existing markets { a scenario that fails to match the current real-
world situation. For this reason, recent work has started to examine a setting
with two or more markets, because that allows for the coexistence of taxed and
untaxed markets.
In agent-based simulations with two markets, Westerho and Dieci (2006)
and Mannaro et al. (2008) analyze the eects of a FTT either implemented as
encompassing or as a unilateral tax, i.e. where a tax haven exists. Westerho
and Dieci (2006) use agents applying technical and fundamental analysis for
trading on two dierent markets. When a FTT is levied on one market they
show that volatility decreases in the taxed market and increases in the untaxed
one. In contrast, with a dierent agent-based modelling approach, Mannaro
et al. (2008) argue that the higher a FTT, the higher the increase in volatility
in the taxed market.
Hanke et al. (2010) use laboratory markets to investigate the eects of a
FTT. They report that a FTT only imposed on one market increases volatility
5See Lux (1998); Lux and Marchesi (2000); Hommes (2006) for studies with the chartist
and fundamentalist approach.
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when the market is small and illiquid, but has no impact on volatility when the
market is large and liquid. Thus, Hanke et al. (2010) stress the crucial interplay
of liquidity and volatiltiy when a FTT is imposed.6 This important relationship
is also addressed by Pellizzari and Westerho (2009) and Kirchler et al. (2011).
Both focus on the market microstructure as an important issue regarding the
eects of a FTT. Pellizzari and Westerho (2009) show { in the framework of a
one-market agent-based model, though { that in a dealership market where liq-
uidity is held constant through articial market makers a FTT has no negative
eects on volatility. By contrast, in a taxed double-auction market volatility
rises as soon as liquidity drops. Because of a lower orderbook depth, buy- and
sell-orders have a greater price impact which makes prices more volatile. Kirch-
ler et al. (2011) tackle this question with laboratory experiments where traders
can trade on two simultaneously running nancial markets. They conclude
that in markets without market makers an unilaterally imposed FTT increases
volatility, while in markets with market makers { and therefore constant liquid-
ity { an unilaterally imposed FTT even decreases volatility. Hence, again there
is no consensus on the consequences of a FTT of the market principle-type on
price volatility and market eciency in the academic literature.
So far no paper has explored the eects of an implementation of a FTT
implemented as residence principle or as mixture of market and residence prin-
ciple, leaving it an open question how the institutional details of a FTT matter
for its eects. We are going to ll this gap with this paper, concentrating not
only on aggregate market outcomes in our analysis, but also on how a FTT
aects individual trader behavior.
6The relationship between market liquidity and the price impact of orders has also been
explored by Ehrenstein et al. (2005), Lillo and Farmer (2005), and Mannaro et al. (2008).
Ehrenstein et al. (2005) and Mannaro et al. (2008) argue that transaction taxes might have
a negative impact on market liquidity, hinting at increasing volatility when the market is
illiquid.
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3 Design of the Experiment
The fundamental value of the asset traded (expressed in Taler) is modelled as
geometric Brownian motion:
FVk = FVk 1  ek : (1)
FVk denotes the fundamental value in period k and k is a normally dis-
tributed random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 10
percent. The FV0 is set to 40. We draw one fundamental value path randomly
(path I) and then create a counterpart by mirroring path I at the unconditional
expected value of the FV.7 In half of the sessions for each treatment we use
path I, in the other half path II. Furthermore, we introduce a symmetric in-
formation structure. In each period each subject receives a private signal on
the fundamental value of the asset. This signal is calculated as the current FV
plus a noise term with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 5 percent.
Estimation errors cancel out across subjects to make sure that each market has
an unbiased estimation of the FV.8
The treatments are designed to test the eects of a nancial transaction tax
(FTT), either implemented as a tax on each transaction conducted in a given
market (market principle), or a tax on each transaction by a person hailing from
a given jurisdiction (residence principle), or a combination of both.
Subjects can trade units of one asset on two dierent markets (denoted LEFT
and RIGHT). Subjects are assigned to one market as their home market, i.e.,
half of the subjects are residents of market LEFT (home market LEFT) and the
other half are residents of market RIGHT (home market RIGHT). This enables
us to tax transactions on a particular market or the residents of a given market
(or jurisdiction), respectively, within various taxation scenarios.
7In particular,
FVk(pathII) = 80  FVk(pathI):
8This was implemented by drawing positive estimation errors for half of the subjects and
using the respective negative error terms for the other half of subjects.
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As a preliminary before presenting design details, we provide the following
denitions: A session consists of two markets (LEFT and RIGHT) where ten
subjects can trade simultaneously for a sequence of 8 periods. These are di-
vided into two phases of 4 consecutive trading periods where a certain taxation
scenario is levied. A taxation scenario (treatment) species how a FTT of 0.1
percent is collected, i.e. either as a tax on transactions in a given market, as a
tax on residents of a given market (jurisdiction), or a combination of both.
Each session is populated by 10 subjects and has 8 periods of 4 minutes
trading.9 Subjects trade units of the asset on two continuous double auction
markets simultaneously. Both markets (LEFT and RIGHT) are displayed on
the trading screen at the same time. It is possible to buy assets on the right
market and to sell them on the left market, or vice versa, as it is possible to
buy or sell assets on the same market.
3.1 Treatments
We implement four treatments which only dier with respect to the taxation
scenarios.
Treatment M: market principle. This taxation scenario follows the
proposal of Tobin (1978) to introduce a FTT on nancial markets as a market
tax. This means that each trade on the taxed market is taxed, irrespective of
the residencies of the involved traders. For the sake of simplicity we only tax
market LEFT, while market RIGHT serves as tax haven.
Treatment R: residence principle. This taxation scenario follows the
idea of imposing a FTT on residents of a given market (jurisdiction). Every
market participant who is resident in the jurisdiction that levies a FTT is taxed
for all his trading activities, no matter whether these are conducted on the
domestic or a foreign market. In particular, subjects who are residents of the
9Before trading started subjects had 15 minutes to read written instructions. Questions
were answered privately. Then the trading screen was explained and two trial periods (not
relevant for payment) were conducted to allow subjects to become familiar with the trading
screen and the trading procedure (see Appendix C for the trading screen and the experimental
instructions).
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left market (home market LEFT) are taxed for each trade they make, no matter
whether it happens on the left or right market. Subjects with residence on the
right market (home market RIGHT) can trade on the left and right market
without being taxed.
Treatment MRSAME: market and residence principle on the same
market. Treatment MRSAME is a combination of treatments M and R and
comes close to the plans of eleven members of the European Union for the
implementation of a FTT. We implement the FTT on market LEFT where the
market and residence principles are applied at the same time: subjects with
home market LEFT are taxed irrespective whether they trade on the left or
right market (residence principle). In addition, subjects with home market
RIGHT who trade on the LEFT market are taxed as well (market principle).
Only trading on the right market remains untaxed for subject with home market
RIGHT.
Treatment MRDIFF: market and residence principle on dierent
markets. This treatment stands for the possible scenario that one country
imposes a FTT according to the residence principle and another country imposes
a FTT following the market principle. A FTT for subjects with home market
LEFT is applied according to the residence principle. In addition, the market
principle is applied on the right market. Thus, subjects with home market LEFT
are taxed by their home jurisdiction whenever they trade and additionally face
a tax of 0.1 percent when trading on the right market. In contrast, subjects
with home market RIGHT are only taxed for trading on their home market, as
market LEFT remains untaxed for them.
Table 1 shows the taxation scenarios depending on residence and trading
activity, i.e. trading on the left or right market.
Insert Table 1 about here
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3.2 The Order of Implementing the FTT
In all treatments we use a specic taxation scenario either in the rst phase
(periods 1-4) or in the second phase (periods 5-8). For instance, when we
introduce a FTT in the rst phase, we abolish the FTT in the second phase.
To control for possible learning eects in each treatment, we impose a FTT in
half of the sessions in the rst phase, and in the second phase in the other half
of the sessions. Before the beginning of each phase subjects are informed about
the imposition/abolition of a FTT with an announcement screen. This screen
is shown for one minute and outlines in detail how the FTT is levied. It also
provides a calculation example for taxation. Subjects do not get any information
about the possible implementation of a FTT before the main experiment starts
and they are not informed in advance whether and when the taxation is changed
again, i.e., the taxation changes come as a surprise. Once a FTT has been
introduced, the tax rate is also displayed on the trading screen.
3.3 Market Architecture and Implementation
In each session half of the subjects are initially endowed with 75 units of the
asset and 3000 in Taler (experimental currency). The other half starts with 25
units of the asset and 5000 in Taler. Given an initial fundamental value FV0 of
40, each subject's initial wealth is 6000 in Taler. Holdings of assets and Taler
are carried over from one period to the next. Furthermore, subjects are able to
go short up to 100 units of the asset and 6000 in Taler.10 Before the beginning
of a new period, all order books are emptied and there are no interest payments
on holdings in assets or cash. To avoid end-of-experiment eects, subjects are
told that the experiment will end between period 6 and 12.
In this experiment all units of the asset are bought back at the fundamental
value of the last period. Thus, nal wealth is the sum of the portfolio value of
the asset (units of the asset held multiplied by the fundamental value of the last
10The maximum levels of shorting assets and cash add up to double their initial average
endowments.
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period) and cash holdings. This sum is converted into Euros at an exchange
rate of 1 EUR = 400 Taler.
In total, we conducted 12 sessions for each of the four treatments, resulting
in 48 sessions and a total of 480 subjects participating in the experiments. All
subjects were economics and business students at the University of Innsbruck,
recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Sessions were computerized using zTree
3.2.8 (Fischbacher, 2007) and lasted about 90 minutes. Average payment to
subjects was EUR 20.4.
3.4 Elicitation of Risk Attitude and Loss Aversion
In this experiment, we also conducted two tasks to elicit subjects' risk attitudes
and loss aversion. To test for subjects' risk attitudes we employ a mechanism
based on Gneezy and Potters (1997). We endow subjects with EUR 2, out of
which they can invest an amount X in a 50/50 coin ip lottery. If the subject
wins in the lottery she earns EUR 2+1.5X, and if she loses she earns EUR 2-X.
The more risk averse, the less a subject would invest in the lottery, and thus
the lower is X.
For the elicitation of loss aversion we employ a method developed by Gachter
et al. (2007). Subjects are asked to either accept or reject a series of coin ip
lotteries. One of the lotteries is later chosen randomly to determine a subject's
earnings. In case the randomly chosen lottery is rejected, the subject earns EUR
0, regardless of the outcome of the coin ip. In case the lottery is accepted the
subject either earns EUR 5 or loses an amount X. The amount X varies across
lotteries, ranging from a minimum loss of EUR 2 to a maximum loss of EUR
6. Assuming a simple piecewise linear loss aversion specication, the row in
which a subject switches from accepting the lottery to rejecting it denes the
loss aversion parameter. It ranges from \larger than 2.5" in case of rejecting all
lotteries to \lower than 0.83" in case of accepting all lotteries.11
11If losses were incurred in one part of the experiment they were deducted from prots in
other parts. No subject came close to an overall loss.
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4 The Eects of FTT on Aggregate Market Out-
comes
We use the following panel regression model to investigate the consequences
of a FTT on the market variables trading volume, price volatility, and market
eciency:
ym;p = + 1LEFTp + 2RIGHTp + m;p: (2)
Here, ym;p is a generic placeholder for the dependent variables explained
below,m indicates cross-section (either the LEFT or RIGHT market in a specic
session) and p phase (i.e., four periods in which a certain taxation scenario is
applied). LEFT is a binary dummy for the left market and RIGHT is a binary
dummy for the right market when a taxation scenario is applied. Consequently,
intercept  represents the state in which both markets are untaxed, i.e. no
taxation scenario is imposed. We apply clustered standard errors on a session
level to allow for correlation within sessions and independence of observations
between sessions. In addition, we run pairwise Wald-tests to test for dierences
between the left and the right market when a taxation scenario is applied.
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 2 provides formulae for the dependent variables on a macro level.
Following Kirchler et al. (2011) we normalize trading volume (V OL) by the
mean and standard deviation of trading volume in each session s to control for
idiosyncratic eects of individual sessions. As one can see from Table 2 the
means and standard deviations are calculated from period data. To arrive at
the normalized volume of phase p of market m (either LEFT or RIGHT) the
average of the respective four period values is calculated.
A similar approach as for normalized trading volume is applied for the volatil-
ity measure { the standard deviation of normalized returns (SDRET ). Log-
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returns between consecutive trades i, rets;m;i, are normalized by the mean and
the standard deviation in each session.12 The standard deviation of these nor-
malized returns in each market phase serves as dependent variable. With this
approach sessions with idiosyncratic eects in the absolute level of volatility
become comparable.
As a proxy for mispricing, relative absolute deviation (RAD) is calculated
as the absolute dierence between mean prices per period and the respective
FVs, benchmarked at the average FV in the market (see Stockl et al. (2010)).
Hence, a high level of RAD indicates strong mispricing and therefore a low level
of market eciency.
Additionally, we measure the level of tax revenues (TAX) prior to and after
the imposition of a FTT. We calculate both, naive hypothetical tax revenues of
untaxed markets by multiplying the trading volume with the tax rate and actual
realized tax revenues after the imposition of the tax. We further normalize tax
revenues (either naive or realized) by the mean and standard deviation in each
market. We do not normalize on a session level as we want to measure the
impact of a tax on the tax revenues of each individual jurisdiction. Thus, we
use a dierent regression model which is outlined in Section 4.4.
For the variables V OL, RAD and TAX period values are calculated rst
and the mean per phase p and market m is used in the regression.
4.1 Trading Volume
Figure 1 shows descriptive statistics for normalized trading volume (V OL) and
Table 3 provides the results of the regressions according to equation (2).
Insert Figure 1 about here
In treatment M trading volume drops signicantly on the left market (taxed
market) and increases signicantly on the right market (untaxed market) after
a FTT is imposed. This is straightforward, as avoiding the tax is easy for
12See the discussion in Plerou et al. (1999) on the importance of normalizing returns from
dierent observations.
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everybody by trading on the untaxed RIGHT market. In contrast, treatment R
shows almost no dierences in trading volume after a tax is levied on subjects
with home market LEFT (residence principle). Thus, we observe no major
distorting eects of a FTT when it is implemented according to the residence
principle.
Insert Table 3 about here
Treatment MRSAME shows similar patterns as treatment M, though the
eects are somewhat weaker. Again, trading volume is signicantly reduced on
the left market where a FTT is imposed on residents and as a market tax for
foreigners. Trading volume increases signicantly on the right market. This
pattern is driven by residents of market RIGHT who leave the left market and
trade on the right market without any tax burden. However, traders with home
market LEFT still provide liquidity to the left market, making the eects less
pronounced compared to treatment M. In treatment MRDIFF one can observe
the opposite eects: a strong and signicant increase in trading volume in the
left market and a signicant decrease of trading volume in the right market.
Subjects with home market LEFT avoid possible double taxation on the right
market and subjects with home market RIGHT also shift their trading activity
to the left market to avoid taxation on their home market.
4.2 Volatility
One of the most controversially discussed issues surrounding the implementa-
tion of a FTT is how price volatility is aected. Descriptive results are outlined
in Figure 2 and econometric estimations are shown in Table 4. We nd that the
development of volatility varies markedly across treatments. After the imposi-
tion of the FTT in treatment M, the level of volatility increases in the taxed
market (LEFT), whereas it remains almost unchanged in the untaxed market
(RIGHT). Most importantly, we report a signicant dierence between the left
market and the right market when a tax is levied (see pairwise Wald-tests in
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Table 4). However, in treatment R no dierences between market LEFT and
market RIGHT are visible. Thus, imposing a residence principle on subjects
with home market LEFT causes no changes in volatility. Similarly to treatment
M, we report an increase of volatility in the left market in treatment MRSAME
and a slight decrease in volatility in the right market. Again, we nd a signi-
cant dierence between the left and the right market when a tax is imposed. In
treatment MRDIFF we nd the opposite pattern: volatility decreases in market
LEFT and increases in market RIGHT when a residence tax (LEFT) and a
market tax (RIGHT) are applied. Volatility in both markets is signicantly dif-
ferent from each other. Hence, volatility in our markets is mostly volume-driven:
whenever volume is high, volatility is low, and vice versa.
Insert Figure 2 and Table 4 about here
4.3 Market Eciency
The values of RAD in the dierent treatments are shown in Figure 3. Econo-
metric tests are provided in Table 5. They show that the implementation of
a FTT has no signicant eect on market eciency in any of treatments M,
MRSAME and MRDIFF. Only when a residence tax is levied in treatment R,
mispricing is signicantly reduced in the left market. This is mainly driven by
one outlier in a market that was untaxed. Therefore ineciency was highest
in this treatment. However, the ineciency observed in this treatment when
LEFT is taxed, is at the same level as in the other three treatments. Thus, the
reduced ineciency is a result of a less ecient benchmark, rather when indeed
lower ineciency, when compared to other treatments.
Insert Figure 3 and Table 5 about here
4.4 Tax Revenues
In the political debate on the implementation of a FTT tax revenues are a core
argument of the proponents of the tax. Therefore, we calculate a naive estimate
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of hypothetical tax revenues { i.e., tax revenue if trading volume would not
change after the introduction of a tax { and compare it to the actually realized
tax revenues in each treatment. Figure 4 gives descriptive results on naive and
realized tax revenues.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Since we measure level of tax revenues prior to and after the imposition of
a FTT for each market (jurisdiction) separately, a dierent regression model is
used:
ym;p = + 1FTTp + m;p: (3)
Here, ym;p is a generic placeholder for the tax revenues in the phase prior to
and after the introduction of a FTT on each market, m indicates cross-section
(either the LEFT or RIGHT market in a specic session) and p phase (i.e.,
four periods in which a certain taxation scenario is applied). FTT is a binary
dummy for the left or right market when a tax is levied and the intercept 
represents the state in which the market is untaxed.
Table 6 provides econometric estimations. We see that in treatment M real-
ized tax revenues are signicantly lower than naively estimated hypothetical tax
revenues. This result is driven by the strong shift in trading volume out of the
taxed market LEFT. In contrast, we nd no signicant changes in tax revenues
prior and after the introduction of a FTT in treatments R and MRSAME. The
latter eect can be explained by a lower shift in trading volume after the im-
position of a FTT as traders taxed according to the residence principle cannot
avoid the tax, except by not trading. In treatment MRDIFF market LEFT as
well as market RIGHT impose a FTT. Both market places show a signicantly
lower amount of tax revenues once a FTT is implemented, compared to the
naive tax revenues. The extremely low tax revenues in the right market are
due to its market tax, which traders avoid by trading on the left market. The
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signicantly lower tax revenues on the left market are triggered by the residence
tax of traders with home market LEFT, who trade less. This eect is not com-
pensated by traders with home market RIGHT, although they trade without
tax burden on the left market.
Insert Table 6 about here
4.5 Discussion of Market Outcomes
To sum up, the results on a macro level show a very clear picture. The imple-
mentation of a FTT as a market tax (treatment M) or as a combination of a
market and a residence tax (treatment MRSAME and treatment MRDIFF) has
negative eects on the marketplace which imposes the FTT as a market tax. In
particular, subjects avoid a market tax and shift most of their trading volume
to the tax haven. Due to the loss of liquidity, volatility is signicantly higher
in markets with a market tax compared to the ones without market tax. This
result is in line with earlier evidence in Hanke et al. (2010) and Kirchler et al.
(2011).
When the residence principle is applied { an institutional form of a FTT
not discussed in the literature so far { the aected traders cannot avoid the
tax and therefore they provide higher liquidity to the market compared to a
scenario with a market tax that is easily avoided. This is also conrmed by
running regression equation (2) with limit orders as dependent variable. The
number of posted limit orders decreases signicantly in the taxed market after
the imposition of a FTT in treatments with a market tax (M and MRSAME: z-
values of -7.872 and -4.196, respectively). In contrast, liquidity, measured by the
number of limit orders, stays constant (R, z-value of 0.407) or even increases
(MRDIFF, z-value of 6.823) in treatments where a residence tax is imposed
without a corresponding market tax. As a consequence, the implementation of
a FTT according to the residence principle has no negative eects on volume
and volatility in its plain-vanilla form in treatment R. This non-negative eect
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of a residence-based tax is reinforced and even leads to a signicantly lower
volatility of this market as soon as the other market imposes a market-based
tax. This pattern is evident in treatment MRDIFF as volatility decreases in the
left market because of an inow of liquidity from the right market.
5 Analysis of Individual-Level Data
Our experimental approach allows to examine individual level data on trading
behavior in detail. Here, we investigate whether a FTT has dierent eects
on traders with dierent levels of risk tolerance. To do so, we rst establish
whether risk attitudes are related to trading behavior in general. Then we
proceed and check whether a FTT has dierent eects on traders with dierent
risk attitudes.13
5.1 Risk Aversion and Individual Trading
To explore dierences in the trading behavior of subjects conditional on their
risk attitudes, we run the following regression model:
yi = + 1M RISKi + 2R RISKi +
3MRSAME RISKi + 4MRDIFF RISKi + i: (4)
ys is a generic placeholder for the dependent variables explained below, i
identies a particular subject. The interacted binary dummy variables for each
treatment { e.g., M*RISK { measure the impact of subject's risk preferences
in each treatment. RISK stands for the amount X invested in the risky lottery
in the risk aversion task (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). The higher a subject's
13Since not only risk attitudes might be important for trading on markets, we also consider
loss aversion as a potentially important trader characteristic in order to explain trading be-
havior. However, in our analysis we do not observe any signicant impact of subjects' level
of loss aversion (parameter ) on their trading behavior, as shown in Appendix A and B. In
fact, adding loss aversion as an explanatory variable makes the model t worse (as measured
by BIC or AIC). For this reason, and for the sake of brevity and readability, we therefore
relegate the analysis including loss aversion to the Appendix.
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amount X is, the less risk-averse she is considered. The intercept  represents
the average of all treatments.14 Table 7 presents the dependent variables: nor-
malized trading volume per subject, normalized limit orders per subject, and
normalized standard deviation of stock holdings per subject.15 It is important
to mention that as all dependent variables are normalized the interacted binary
dummies only measure the impact of the risk coecient.
Insert Table 7 about here
Table 8 outlines the results. We nd that subjects with high risk tolerance
coecients show a signicantly higher trading activity. Subjects who are less
risk-averse trade signicantly more and post signicantly more limit orders com-
pared to their more risk-averse counterparts. These results are robust across all
treatments. As a consequence, subjects with high risk coecients show a sig-
nicantly higher standard deviation of stock holdings and therefore hold more
volatile and extreme portfolio positions over time.
Insert Table 8 about here
Additionally, we analyze the use of short selling and borrowing cash with
regards to subjects' risk attitudes. As outlined above, short selling and borrow-
ing was allowed up to 100 percent of the initial endowments in assets and cash.
We nd that only 64 out of 480 subjects (13.3 percent) have short positions in
assets and 41 subjects (8.5 percent) have negative cash holdings at the end of
at least one period. Approximately 60 percent of the subjects who go at least
once short in assets or cash have the highest risk coecient of 2, while only
34 percent of the subjects who do not use short-selling or borrowing have the
highest risk coecient. To test whether there is a signicant dierence in the
distribution of risk coecients between these two groups, we run a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov equality-of-distributions test. Indeed, we nd a signicant dierence
14We apply clustered standard errors on a session level to allow for correlation within sessions
and independence between sessions.
15Again, we normalize trading volume, limit orders and standard deviation of stock holdings
per subject to control for idiosyncratic eects of individual sessions as argued in Section 4.
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between the distribution of both groups (D-value for short-selling: 0.2462, p-
value: 0.002, N=480; D-value for borrowing: 0.2492, p-value: 0.019; N=480).
Thus, the more risk tolerant subjects are, the more they use short selling and
borrowing.
We summarize this subsection by noting that subjects' trading behavior
strongly depends on their risk tolerance. More specically, subjects with more
risk tolerance { i.e. with lower degrees of risk aversion { trade more, post more
limit orders, show a higher volatility in their asset holdings and use short selling
opportunities more frequently. These eects hold across all treatments. Based
on these ndings, we can now proceed to answer our nal question, whether the
imposition of a FTT has dierent eects on traders with dierent levels of risk
aversion.
5.2 Interaction of FTT with Risk Aversion
We apply the following regression model to explore whether subjects with dif-
ferent risk attitudes react dierently to the imposition of a FTT:
ym;p = + 1RISKi + i: (5)
Here, ym;p is a generic placeholder for the dependent variables and RISKi
stands for the risk coecient of subject i.16
Insert Table 9 about here
We use the following dependent variables: First, we calculate the normalized
sum of all tax payments per subject i (SUMTAXi). This allows to test whether
subjects with dierent risk attitudes show a dierent proneness for paying the
tax. Second, we calculate subject i's ratio between the trading volume on the
left market and on the right market when a tax is levied (MARKETSHAREi).
16Again, we apply clustered standard errors on a session level.
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Here, we examine whether less risk averse subjects avoid more taxes resulting in
a smaller market share on the taxed market compared to more risk averse sub-
jects. Third, we compare each subject's change in trading volume prior and after
a FTT is applied on both markets (V OLLEFT and V OLRIGHT ). This
enables us to investigate whether risk attitude determines behavioral changes
after the imposition of a FTT on each market place. Table 9 shows the vari-
ables, and Table 10 presents the econometric results. Except for one single case
(which lies well in the limits of chance), we nd no dierences in behavior of
subjects with dierent risk attitudes when a FTT is applied.
Insert Table 10 about here
In sum, this nal subsection has provided strong evidence that traders with
dierent risk attitudes do not react dierently to the imposition of a FTT. This
means that risk tolerant and risk averse traders adapt their trading behavior in
the same way when a FTT is levied. As a consequence, the macro results of our
paper are not primarily driven by the tax avoiding behavior of traders with low
levels of risk aversion. Instead, results on a macro level are driven by adaptive
behavior of all traders, which is independent of their risk attitudes (and also
independent of their level of loss aversion, as shown in the Appendix).
6 Conclusion
The possible introduction of a FTT in eleven member states of the European
Union in 2015 constitutes a very large-scale policy experiment, with unclear con-
sequences for nancial markets all over Europe (and most likely elsewhere). We
consider laboratory experiments as ideal, cheap, and practically riskfree testbeds
to explore likely consequences of a legislative change before this change is ac-
tually implemented.17 For this reason, we conducted experiments to explore
17Several researchers have advocated the potential usefulness of experiments for address-
ing policy-relevant questions. For instance, Roth (2002) discusses the role of (experimental)
economists as institutional engineers. However, it is clear that experiments are by necessity
always a simplication and can thus not give a perfect and fully comprehensive picture of
22
the eects of a FTT on market outcomes and individual traders. We compared
the \market principle" and the \residence principle" as basis of a FTT, ex-
amining both principles separately, but also jointly. We found that applying
only the residence principle as basis for a FTT had no signicant eects on
trading volume or volatility. The market principle, however, resulted in large
and signicant shifts in trading volume from the taxed market to the untaxed
alternative. With liquidity in the taxed market evaporating, volatility increased
signicantly, while it dropped in the untaxed alternative.
The combined implementation of market and residence principle within one
jurisdiction showed the following eects: a signicant drop in trading volume in
the jurisdiction implementing both principles and a respective increase in the
other one. By contrast, volatility increased in the jurisdiction with a tax on
residents and market tax for foreigners, whereas it dropped in the one without
any tax burdens. However, both eects were considerably weaker than when
only the market principle was applied. This means that adding the residence
principle dampened (rather than exacerbated) the negative repercussions from
applying a market principle. We consider the latter a particularly interesting,
and novel, nding of our experiment. Our results highlight that details of the
implementation are of paramount importance and economists should get their
hands dirty with these details.
the real-world situation under consideration (see e.g. List (2011) for limitations of laboratory
experiments).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Taxation Scenarios for the various treatments depending on subjects'
home market and trading place (LEFT or RIGHT).
Tax when trading on market...
Treatment M LEFT RIGHT
Home Market LEFT 0.1% -
Home Market RIGHT 0.1% -
Treatment R LEFT RIGHT
Home Market LEFT 0.1% 0.1%
Home Market RIGHT - -
Treatment MRSAME LEFT RIGHT
Home Market LEFT 0.1% 0.1%
Home Market RIGHT 0.1% -
Treatment MRDIFF LEFT RIGHT
Home Market LEFT 0.1% 0.2%
Home Market RIGHT - 0.1%
In case of taxation, entries show the tax rate conditional
on the residence of the subjects for each market.
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Table 2: Formulae for the calculation of variables on the market level.
Measure Calculation
Normalized trading volume V OLs;m;k = (vols;m;k   vols)=vols
Normalized returns (tick data) RETs;m;i = (rets;m;i   rets)=rets
SD of normalized returns SDRET = SD(RETs;m;i)
Relative absolute deviation RADs;m;k =
Ps;m;k   FVs;m;k=jFVsj
Normalized tax revenues TAXm;k = (taxm;k   taxm)=taxm
s...session, m...market (either LEFT or RIGHT), k...period, i...trades.
vols;m;k = units of the asset traded in period k; vols = average trading
volume per period of the asset in session s; vols = standard deviation of
all trading volumes per period of the asset in session s;
rets;m;i = ln(Ps;m;i)   ln(Ps;m;i 1); Ps;m;i = trading price of trade i;
rets = average of all returns (ret) in session s; rets = standard deviation
of all returns (ret) in session s; Ps;m;k = (volume-weighted) mean price;
FVs;m;k = fundamental value in session s and period k (identical in both
markets); FVs = average fundamental value of the session; taxm;k = tax
revenues in Taler in market m and period k; taxm = average tax revenues
per period in Taler in market m; taxm = standard deviation of all tax
revenues per period in Taler in market m;
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Table 3: Trading volume (V OL) across treatments.
V OL M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept -0.023 -0.060 0.014 0.083
(-0.571) (-0.592) (0.136) (1.186)
LEFT -0.997*** 0.150 -0.688*** 0.685***
(-10.420) (0.704) (-2.962) (3.543)
RIGHT 1.091*** 0.090 0.633*** -1.016***
(13.518) (0.282) (2.926) (-9.338)
Pairwise Wald-tests:
LEFT vs.
RIGHT 976.00*** 0.03 43.68*** 137.90***
N 48 48 48 48
Treatments: M: Market tax on market LEFT. R: Residence tax for res-
idents of market LEFT. MRSAME: Residence tax for residents of mar-
ket LEFT and corresponding market tax on market LEFT. MRDIFF:
Residence tax for residents of market LEFT and corresponding market
tax on market RIGHT.
Variables: Intercept: phase in which both markets are untaxed. LEFT:
market LEFT, either taxed or untaxed. RIGHT: market RIGHT, ei-
ther taxed or untaxed.
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signicance levels
of a double-sided test. Top: Coecient values with corresponding z-
values (in parentheses) are provided. Bottom: t-statistics of pairwise
Wald-tests are shown.
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Table 4: Volatility (SDRET ) across treatments.
SDRET M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 0.935*** 0.974*** 0.924*** 1.049***
(9.748) (11.433) (13.020) (13.905)
LEFT 0.294 -0.058 0.240 -0.175
(1.188) (-0.280) (1.073) (-1.137)
RIGHT -0.031 0.012 -0.121 0.164
(-0.176) (0.072) (-0.883) (1.060)
Pairwise Wald-tests:
LEFT vs.
RIGHT 3.93** 0.68 7.14*** 4.81**
N 47 48 48 45
Treatments: M: Market tax on market LEFT. R: Residence tax for
residents of market LEFT. MRSAME: Residence tax for residents
of market LEFT and corresponding market tax on market LEFT.
MRDIFF: Residence tax for residents of market LEFT and corre-
sponding market tax on market RIGHT.
Variables: Intercept: phase in which both markets are untaxed.
LEFT: market LEFT, either taxed or untaxed. RIGHT: market
RIGHT, either taxed or untaxed.
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signicance levels
of a double-sided test. Top: Coecient values with corresponding z-
values (in parentheses) are provided. Bottom: t-statistics of pairwise
Wald-tests are shown.
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Table 5: Market eciency (RAD) across treatments.
RAD M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 0.082*** 0.098*** 0.082*** 0.137**
(5.915) (7.313) (7.478) (2.585)
LEFT 0.029 -0.030*** 0.002 -0.053
(0.876) (-3.021) (0.114) (-1.078)
RIGHT -0.003 -0.018 -0.001 -0.047
(-0.200) (-1.413) (-0.079) (-0.871)
Pairwise Wald-tests:
LEFT vs.
RIGHT 1.35 4.64** 0.46 0.17
N 48 48 48 46
Treatments: M: Market tax on market LEFT. R: Residence tax for
residents of market LEFT. MRSAME: Residence tax for residents
of market LEFT and corresponding market tax on market LEFT.
MRDIFF: Residence tax for residents of market LEFT and correspond-
ing market tax on market RIGHT.
Variables: Intercept: phase in which both markets are untaxed.
LEFT: market LEFT, either taxed or untaxed. RIGHT: market
RIGHT, either taxed or untaxed.
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signicance levels
of a double-sided test. Top: Coecient values with corresponding z-
values (in parentheses) are provided. Bottom: t-statistics of pairwise
Wald-tests are shown.
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Table 6: Normalized tax revenues (TAX) for market LEFT and market RIGHT
across the various taxation scenarios.
TAX M R MRSAME MRDIFF
LEFT LEFT LEFT LEFT RIGHT
Intercept 0.625*** 0.116 -0.113 0.377*** 0.758***
(7.080) (0.713) (-0.729) (5.721) (31.506)
FTT -1.249*** -0.232 0.206 -0.755*** -1.516***
(-7.080) (-0.713) (0.688) (-5.721) (-31.506)
N 24 24 24 24 24
Treatments: M: market tax on market LEFT. R: tax for residents
of market LEFT. MRSAME: tax for residents of market LEFT and
corresponding market tax on market LEFT. MRDIFF: tax for residents
of market LEFT and corresponding market tax on market RIGHT.
Variables: Intercept: phase in which a market is untaxed. FTT: phase
in which a market is taxed.
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signicance levels of
a double-sided test. Coecient values with corresponding z-values (in
parentheses) are provided.
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Table 7: Formulae for the calculation of variables on an individual level.
Measure Calculation
Normalized trading volume V OL=i (voli   vols)=vols
Normalized limit orders LOi = (loi   los)=los
Normalized SD of stock holdings SDSTOCKi = (sd stocki   sd stocks)=sd stocks
s...session, i...trader.
voli = average number of traded assets per period for trader i; vols = average trading
volume per period in session s among all subjects; vols = standard deviation of all
trading volumes among all subjects in session s; loi = average number of limit orders
per period for trader i; los = average number of of all limit orders (lo) among all
subjects in session s; los = standard deviation of the number of all limit orders (lo)
in session s among all subjects; sd stockt = standard deviation of stock holdings
per trader i; sd stocks = average standard deviation of stock holdings in session s;
sd stocks = standard deviation of all standard deviations of stock holdings in session
s;
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Table 8: Regression for dierences in behavior conditional on subjects' risk
attitudes.
V OL LO SDSTOCK
Intercept -0.230*** -0.294*** -0.230**
(-3.499) (-3.536) (-2.422)
M*RISK 0.159*** 0.196*** 0.120
(3.128) (2.943) (1.630)
R*RISK 0.180*** 0.240*** 0.207***
(3.430) (3.208) (2.735)
MRSAME*RISK 0.199*** 0.267*** 0.178*
(2.983) (3.790) (1.907)
MRDIFF*RISK 0.166*** 0.201*** 0.199***
(3.648) (3.405) (3.165)
N 480 480 480
Treatments: M: Market tax on market LEFT. R: Resi-
dence tax for residents of market LEFT. MRSAME: Resi-
dence tax for residents of market LEFT and corresponding
market tax on market LEFT. MRDIFF: Residence tax for
residents of market LEFT and corresponding market tax
on market RIGHT.
Variables: V OL: normalized trading volume. LO: nor-
malized limit orders. SDSTOCK: normalized standard
deviation of stock holdings. Intercept: average across all
treatments. RISK: amount X invested in the risky lot-
tery in the risk aversion task (Gneezy and Potters, 1997).
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signi-
cance levels of a double-sided test. Coecient values with
corresponding z-values (in parentheses) are provided.
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Table 10: Regression for SUMTAX, MARKETSHARE, V OLLEFT and
V OLRIGHT .
SUMTAX Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept -0.068 -0.032 -0.147 0.018 -0.126
(-0.833) (-0.156) (-0.912) (0.109) (-0.805)
RISK 0.052 0.023 0.115 -0.015 0.091
(0.834) (0.157) (0.918) (-0.109) (0.804)
N 480 120 120 120 120
MARKETSHARE Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 0.445*** 0.087** 0.579*** 0.308*** 0.901***
(7.281) (2.786) (7.086) (7.005) (13.404)
RISK 0.009 0.041 -0.008 -0.005 -0.019
(0.323) (1.765) (-0.141) (-0.206) (-0.435)
N 408 119 58 115 116
V OLLEFT Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 0.450 -0.853*** 0.159 0.987 1.396***
(1.225) (-10.379) (0.720) (0.821) (4.927)
RISK -0.223 0.142** 0.019 -0.799 -0.236
(-1.031) (2.305) (0.118) (-1.098) (-1.448)
N 472 118 119 116 119
V OLRIGHT Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 1.048 1.039** 0.172 3.222 -0.804***
(1.480) (2.984) (0.411) (1.379) (-5.852)
RISK -0.452 -0.094 0.058 -1.505 0.062
(-1.074) (-0.537) (0.171) (-1.026) (0.714)
N 472 118 119 116 119
Treatments: M: Market tax on market LEFT. R: Residence tax for residents of
market LEFT. MRSAME: Residence tax for residents of market LEFT and corre-
sponding market tax on market LEFT. MRDIFF: Residence tax for residents of
market LEFT and corresponding market tax on market RIGHT.
Variables: SUMTAX: normalized sum of all tax payments per subject.
MARKETSHARE: subject i's ratio between the trading volume on the left
market and on the right market when a tax is levied. V OLLEFT and
V OLRIGHT : subject i's change in trading volume (on market LEFT or RIGHT)
between phases with and without the tax. RISK: amount X invested in the risky
lottery in the risk aversion task (Gneezy and Potters, 1997).
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signicance levels of a double-sided
test. Coecient values with corresponding z-values (in parentheses) are provided.
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Figure 1: Descriptive statistics for V OL (normalized trading volume) averaged
per phase and conditional on treatment and taxation scenario. NO stands for
periods without any tax, LEFT for the left market and RIGHT for the right
market when a tax is applied (on any market).
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Figure 2: Descriptive statistics for SDRET (standard deviation of normalized
returns) averaged per phase and conditional on treatment and taxation scenario.
NO stands for periods without any tax, LEFT for the left market and RIGHT
for the right market when a taxation scenario is applied.
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Figure 3: Descriptive statistics for RAD (relative absolute deviation of prices
compared to fundamentals) averaged per phase and conditional on treatment
and taxation scenario. NO stands for periods without any tax, LEFT for
the left market and RIGHT for the right market when a taxation scenario is
applied.
40
0
20
40
60
80
m
e
di
an
 o
f n
ai
ve
 a
nd
 re
al
ize
d 
ta
x 
re
ve
nu
es
M R MR_SAME MR_DIFF
LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT
TAX
Naive Realized
Figure 4: Descriptive statistics for naive and hypothetical tax revenues. Median
of hypothetical and realized tax revenues (in Taler) for market LEFT across the
various taxation scenarios and market RIGHT in MRDIFF.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Loss Aversion and Individual Trading
To explore whether we observe dierences in the trading behavior of subjects
conditional on their level of loss aversion, we run the following regression model:
yi = + 1M  LOSSi + 2R  LOSSi +
3MRSAME  LOSSi + 4MRDIFF  LOSSi + i: (6)
ys is a generic placeholder for the dependent variables explained below, i
stands for subject. The interacted binary dummy variables for each treatment
{ e.g., M*LOSS { measure the impact of subjects' loss aversion in each treat-
ment. LOSS stands for the individual loss aversion parameter  (Gachter et al.,
2007) ranging from larger than 2.5 in case of rejecting all lotteries to smaller than
0.83 in case of accepting all lotteries. The higher the individual loss parameter
, the more loss averse a subject is. The intercept  represents the average of all
treatments. Again, we apply clustered standard errors on a session level to allow
for correlation within sessions and independence between sessions. It is impor-
tant to mention that as all dependent variables are normalized the interacted
binary dummies only measure the impact of the loss aversion coecient.
Table A1 shows that loss aversion has an eect on trading volume in the
expected direction. More loss averse subjects trade less. Adding the coecient
of RISK to the specication in Table A1, we see from Table A2 that the signif-
icance of loss aversion gets weaker, and partly insignicant, when we control for
RISK. In fact, the best model t (according to BIC and AIC) is given when
we only control for RISK, as has been done in the main text in Table 8.
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Table A1: Regression for dierences in behavior conditional on subjects' loss
aversion.
V OL LO SDSTOCK
Intercept 0.321** 0.131 -0.050
(2.013) (1.067) (-0.348)
M*LOSS -0.185** -0.064 0.017
(-2.272) (-0.996) (0.214)
R*LOSS -0.171** -0.064 0.016
(-2.150) (-1.087) (0.211)
MRSAME*LOSS -0.137 -0.055 0.062
(-1.539) (-0.824) (0.820)
MRDIFF*LOSS -0.184** -0.078 0.017
(-2.227) (-1.147) (0.219)
N 458 458 458
Treatments: M: Market tax on market LEFT. R: Res-
idence tax for residents of market LEFT. MRSAME:
Residence tax for residents of market LEFT and corre-
sponding market tax on market LEFT. MRDIFF: Resi-
dence tax for residents of market LEFT and correspond-
ing market tax on market RIGHT.
Variables: V OL: normalized trading volume. LO: nor-
malized limit orders. SDSTOCK: normalized stan-
dard deviation of stock holdings. Intercept: average
across all treatments. LOSS: individual loss aversion
parameter .
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signif-
icance levels of a double-sided test. Coecient values
with corresponding z-values (in parentheses) are pro-
vided.
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Table A2: Regression for dierences in behavior conditional on subjects' risk
and loss aversion.
V OL LO SDSTOCK
Intecept 0.090 -0.237 -0.342*
(0.404) (-1.311) (-1.885)
M*RISK 0.097 0.158 0.007
(1.151) (1.323) (0.057)
R*RISK 0.162** 0.225* 0.259**
(2.212) (1.821) (2.317)
MRSAME*RISK 0.099 0.265*** 0.094
(0.885) (3.120) (0.676)
MRDIFF*RISK 0.168** 0.199** 0.296***
(2.262) (2.069) (4.624)
M*LOSS -0.137 0.011 0.152
(-1.547) (0.126) (1.338)
R*LOSS -0.157* -0.022 0.004
(-1.764) (-0.291) (0.040)
MRSAME*LOSS -0.081 -0.024 0.150
(-0.723) (-0.302) (1.558)
MRDIFF*LOSS -0.183* -0.032 -0.034
(-1.804) (-0.326) (-0.392)
N 458 458 458
Treatments: M: Market tax on market LEFT. R: Resi-
dence tax for residents of market LEFT. MRSAME: Res-
idence tax for residents of market LEFT and correspond-
ing market tax on market LEFT. MRDIFF: Residence
tax for residents of market LEFT and corresponding
market tax on market RIGHT.
Variables: V OL: normalized trading volume. LO: nor-
malized limit orders. SDSTOCK: standard deviation
of stock holdings. Intercept: average across all treat-
ments. RISK: amount X invested in the risky lottery
in the risk aversion task (Gneezy and Potters, 1997).
LOSS: individual loss aversion parameter .
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% sig-
nicance levels of a double-sided test. Coecient values
with corresponding z-values (in parentheses) are pro-
vided.
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Appendix B: Interaction of FTT with Loss Aversion
We apply the following regression model to explore whether subjects with dif-
ferent levels of loss aversion react dierently to the imposition of a FTT:
ym;p = + 1LOSSi + i: (7)
Here, ym;p is a generic placeholder for the dependent variables and LOSSi
stands for the loss aversion coecient of subject i.18 Table B1 shows that
loss aversion is never signicant. This remains true if one adds RISK to the
specication. Table B2 shows that loss aversion remains insignicant when risk
aversion is controlled for. Again, the best model t (according to BIC and AIC)
is given when we only control for RISK, as has been done in the main text in
Table 10.
18Again, we apply clustered standard errors on a session level.
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Table B1: Regression for SUMTAX, MARKETSHARE, V OLLEFT and
V OLRIGHT .
SUMTAX Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 0.008 -0.197 0.167 0.025 0.012
(0.052) (-0.816) (0.599) (0.078) (0.035)
LOSS -0.008 0.093 -0.080 -0.005 -0.026
(-0.103) (0.731) (-0.557) (-0.029) (-0.141)
N 458 113 115 114 116
MARKETSHARE Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 0.391*** 0.182** 0.461*** 0.279*** 0.780***
(6.137) (2.688) (4.463) (3.453) (9.996)
LOSS 0.035 -0.024 0.050 0.017 0.049
(1.418) (-0.968) (1.215) (0.456) (1.525)
N 389 112 56 109 112
V OLLEFT Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept -0.019 -0.494** 0.312 -0.893 1.053**
(-0.072) (-2.482) (1.018) (-1.105) (2.324)
LOSS 0.087 -0.090 -0.065 0.506 -0.039
(0.592) (-1.135) (-0.506) (0.899) (-0.195)
N 450 111 114 110 115
V OLRIGHT Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 0.140 0.944* 0.697 -0.961 -0.502**
(0.312) (2.068) (0.873) (-0.543) (-2.329)
LOSS 0.164 -0.002 -0.219 1.251 -0.119
(0.566) (-0.011) (-0.672) (1.017) (-1.127)
N 450 111 114 110 115
Treatments: M: Market tax on market LEFT. R: Residence tax for residents of
market LEFT. MRSAME: Residence tax for residents of market LEFT and cor-
responding market tax on market LEFT. MRDIFF: Residence tax for residents
of market LEFT and corresponding market tax on market RIGHT.
Variables: SUMTAX: normalized sum of all tax payments per subject.
MARKETSHARE: subject i's ratio between the trading volume on the left
market and on the right market when a tax is levied. V OLLEFT and
V OLRIGHT : subject i's change in trading volume prior and after a FTT
is applied on both markets. LOSS: individual loss aversion parameter .
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signicance levels of a double-
sided test. Coecient values with corresponding z-values (in parentheses) are
provided.
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Table B2: Regression for SUMTAX, MARKETSHARE, V OLLEFT and
V OLRIGHT .
SUMTAX Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept -0.048 -0.158 -0.036 0.077 -0.131
(-0.238) (-0.439) (-0.092) (0.153) (-0.308)
RISK 0.032 -0.022 0.121 -0.030 0.080
(0.477) (-0.145) (0.885) (-0.197) (0.644)
LOSS -0.001 0.088 -0.055 -0.013 -0.009
(-0.010) (0.667) (-0.364) (-0.067) (-0.051)
N 458 113 115 114 116
MARKETSHARE Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 0.355*** 0.138* 0.446*** 0.274** 0.802***
(4.516) (2.054) (3.948) (2.854) (7.258)
RISK 0.021 0.025 0.008 0.003 -0.012
(0.743) (1.100) (0.140) (0.113) (-0.266)
LOSS 0.040 -0.019 0.053 0.017 0.047
(1.551) (-0.749) (1.478) (0.455) (1.390)
N 389 112 56 109 112
V OLLEFT Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 0.287 -0.688*** 0.284 0.388 1.271**
(0.862) (-4.281) (1.011) (0.424) (2.652)
RISK -0.178 0.114* 0.017 -0.738 -0.122
(-0.847) (1.862) (0.107) (-1.093) (-0.674)
LOSS 0.049 -0.071 -0.061 0.293 -0.063
(0.418) (-0.890) (-0.549) (0.757) (-0.351)
N 450 111 114 110 115
V OLRIGHT Overall M R MRSAME MRDIFF
Intercept 0.916** 1.060 0.680 1.347 -0.623*
(2.088) (1.481) (1.240) (1.399) (-1.857)
RISK -0.451 -0.068 0.010 -1.329 0.068
(-1.127) (-0.344) (0.033) (-1.031) (0.742)
LOSS 0.067 -0.014 -0.217 0.868 -0.105
(0.319) (-0.060) (-0.770) (1.086) (-0.874)
N 450 111 114 110 115
Treatments: M: Market tax on market LEFT. R: Residence tax for residents of
market LEFT. MRSAME: Residence tax for residents of market LEFT and corre-
sponding market tax on market LEFT. MRDIFF: Residence tax for residents of
market LEFT and corresponding market tax on market RIGHT.
Variables: SUMTAX: normalized sum of all tax payments per subject.
MARKETSHARE: subject i's ratio between the trading volume on the left
market and on the right market when a tax is levied. V OLLEFT and
V OLRIGHT : subject i's change in trading volume prior and after a FTT is
applied on both markets. RISK: amount X invested in the risky lottery in the
risk aversion task (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). LOSS: individual loss aversion
parameter .
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signicance levels of a double-
sided test. Coecient values with corresponding z-values (in parentheses) are
provided.
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Appendix C: Instructions for the Experiments
Background of the Experiment
This experiment is concerned with replicating an asset market where 10 traders
can trade one asset on two dierent marketplace (Market LEFT and market
RIGHT) simultaneously. Thereby one half of the subjects is a resident of market
LEFT and the other half of market RIGHT. You are a resident of market XY -
this will be displayed on the trading screen as well.
Market Properties
 Initial endowment: Half of the traders start with 75 units of the asset and
3000 cash, while the other half of the traders start with 25 units of the
asset and 5000 cash.
 There are two markets where the asset can be traded - markets LEFT and
RIGHT.
 No interests are paid.
 The prices in the two markets can deviate.
Fundamental value of the asset
The fundamentally justied value - fundamental value need not equal the price -
of the asset (expressed in cash) is the value that would result from a full and fair
analysis of the asset. In reality it depends on micro- and macroeconomic vari-
ables. In our market the fundamental the asset (expressed in cash) is modelled
as a stochastic process:
FVk = FVk 1  ek :
where FVk stands for the fundamental value in period k and k is a normally
distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 10
48
percent. The fundamental value in the current period (increased by 0.5funda-
mental value in the next period.
Information on the fundamental value of the asset
Each period each subject receives a private signal (SIGNAL) on the fundamental
value of the asset (expressed in cash). This signal can be above or below the
actual fundamental value with equal probability. Most signals are close to the
true fundamental value, as only an error term with an expected value of zero
and a standard deviation of 5 percent is added to the fundamental value.
Trading
 All subjects can buy and sell units of the asset at any time. This can be
done on the LEFT or RIGHT market - switching between markets is free
and causes no extra costs. Short selling (negative holdings) is possible up
to an amount of -100 units of the asset and -6.000 in cash. The volume
of each transaction is limited to 20 units of the asset, but trading volume
within a period is unlimited.
 Each period subjects can enter as many BIDs and ASKs (between 1 and
999) as they want - again without restrictions on the LEFT and RIGHT
market.
 IMPORTANT: The price of the asset is set exclusively by you and the
other subjects in the market by supply and demand.
Calculating wealth during the experiment
Your wealth (expressed in cash) during the experiment is comprised of the value
of your holdings in the asset (units of the asset multiplied by the last price) plus
the holdings in cash. For valuing the asset the last price is used.
Wealth = (units of the asset * price of the asset) + cash
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If prices in the two markets deviate, the current price with the higher trading
volume is used.
Payout in EUR in the end of the experiment
Your payment in Euro depends on your total wealth at the end of the experi-
ment. Your holdings of the asset will be valued at their fundamental value (not
price!) of the last period. The nal payment is calculated as follows:
Final wealth = (units of the asset * fundamental value) + cash,
Payout in EUR = Final wealth / 400
Example: assets: 30, fundamental value of the asset: 45, cash: 5050.
Final wealth = (30 * 45) + 5050= 6400
Payout in EUR = 6400 / 400 = 16 Euro
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The trading screen looks as follows:19
Overview of current 
holdings in the asset and
cash.
Current Market Prices
of the asset (in cash).
SELL: You sell the entered quantity at the 
price of the offer with the blue background. If 
you enter a higher quantity than offered in 
the blue box, you sell the offered quantity at 
most.
BUY: You buy the entered quantity at the 
price of the offer with the blue background. If 
you enter a higher quantity than offered in 
the blue box, you sell the offered quantity at 
most.
OFFER TO BUY: you 
have to enter the offered 
price and the quantity. Trade 
does not take place until 
another participant accepts 
your offer.
OFFER TO SELL, ana-
logously to OFFER TO BUY 
(see above).
Price-Chart of the 
current period.
Orderbook – list of all 
offers to buy of all trad-
ers – your own offers to buy 
are written in blue. The offer 
with blue background is 
always the best, i.e., it is the 
one with the highest price for 
the seller.
Orderbook – list of all 
offers to sell of all trad-
ers – your own offers to sell 
are written in blue. The offer 
with blue background is 
always the best, i.e., it is the 
cheapest one for the buyer.
Overview of your offers to buy and your offers to sell of 
the current period (offered prices and quantities). With the “DELETE…” 
buttons own offers can be deleted and so they disappear from the order-
book.
Your signal on the fun-
damental value of the 
asset (in cash).
Market LEFT is your HOME MARKET.
Important Details
 Each trading period lasts 240 seconds, i.e. 4 minutes.
 The experiment lasts between 6 and 12 periods.
19Please note that we have chosen the left market to be the HOME MARKET in this
example screenshot.
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After each trading period a history screen is shown for 10 seconds to provide
you with information on what happened in the market:
Market LEFT is your HOME MARKET.
Overview about your holdings in the asset and cash. 
In addition, wealth and the signal for each period are 
reported.
Price chart of average 
prices per Period in 
each market.
Price of the asset in the end of each period, your individual 
trading volume and the market volume are displayed.
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